the fourth century.
2 A period of religious ambiguity after Constantine Iʹs rise to power ended with the legal abolition of non-Christian cults by Theodosius I in the 380s. In various sectors of society, this legal framework backed groups who took violent measures against religious non-conformists: the pogrom against the Jews of Minorca in 418 that resulted in the latter's mass conversion to Christianity as well as pope Leo's I campaign against the Manichaeans of Rome in the years 443-45 may serve as two examples. 3 All these forms of religious coercion have one thing in common, however: they were directed against the empire's own subjects. Being in a rather defensive position in Late Antiquity, the Empire never seems to have sought to impose Christianity on extra-imperial populations by the means of warfare.
4
Among post-Roman elites, Christianity spread mainly by missionary efforts: Gothic groups had been exposed to the preaching of Ulfilas and his disciples and ultimately adopted a form of Christianity during the process of settling within the imperial borders. This also applies to other warrior elites who took over rule in former provinces of the Roman Empire, including the Spanish Sueves, the Burgundians, and the Vandals. In one way or the other, these groups were exposed to Gothic proselytism and accordingly adopted the Gothic variant of so-called ›Arianism‹, 5 which they maintained until they either succumbed to the religious influence of the local Romanized population -the case of the Burgundians and Visigoths -or were swallowed up by a larger polity professing the faith of Nicaea -the case of Vandal North Africa. The Franks, in turn, accepted the Nicaean faith directly, as did various Anglo-Saxon leaders, the latter addressed directly by missionaries sent by Pope Gregory I to the British Isles. Thanks to the establishment of monastic communities by itinerant peregrini, Christianity was strengthened in all parts of the former Western Roman Empire in the course of the seventh century. 6 Late Roman and post-Roman processes of Christianization often involved a certain degree of coercion: ruling elites generally adopted Christianity first and then contributed to enforcing its adoption among their less powerful peers as well as among the remaining recalcitrant subject populations. 7 Notwithstanding, Christianity was never imposed by force of arms until the Saxons were forced to accept it as a consequence of what might be justifiably termed a conquest or even an annexation of their society at the hands of Frankish elites. Scholarship has traditionally explained this new link between conquest and Christianization as an inner-Christian phenomenon. Specialists of the Carolingian period and of early medieval processes of Christianization thus pointed to the special circumstances of the Frankish conquest of Saxony. Continuous tensions between Franks and Saxons dating from a period preceding the rule of Charlemagne drove the latter to attempt the conquest of Saxony. In this context, Christianization continued a missionary policy already implemented within the Frankish realm and vis-à-vis its Frisian neighbours, but also served as a tool to break Saxon independence and to impose the new Frankish administration. Particularly drastic measures such as the killing of Saxons in Verden or the punishments for religious transgressions as formulated in the Capitulatio de partibus Saxoniae were rated as brutal overreactions to Saxon assaults in 782. They were interpreted as desperate decisions taken by a Frankish ruling elite exasperated by a war that, all in all, lasted almost three decades and was accompanied by parallel military engagements on all fronts of the Carolingian realm. 8 The combination of conquest and forced conversion resulted from what various scholars summarily describe as the collaboration of a ›new‹ church and a ›new‹ political system.
9
This explanation recalls Carl Erdmann's effort to explain the emergence of the crusading idea by claiming that the synthesis of warrior elites and Christianity in Late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages contributed to a militarization of Christianity, an explanation nuanced by Friedrich Prinz and further developed by James Russell. 10 Jan Assmann's hypotheses on the »price of monotheism«, however, raised the question of whether the hitherto prevalent image of a Christian religion militarized due to its adoption by warrior elites idealizes the peaceful character of ancient and late antique Christianity. According to Assmann, recently backed by Philippe Buc, 11 the clear distinction between true and false, characteristic of all monotheistic religions, is responsible, not only for what Assmann calls »the invention of paganism«, 12 but also for various acts of violence committed by adherents to monotheistic religions in the name of religious truth. 13 In this way, the previous responsibilities are reversed: the violent mentality of post-Roman warrior elites did not awaken the aggressive potential of Christianity; rather, thanks to Christianity's latent aggression, the military feats of a post-Roman warrior elite acquired a religious dimension: consequently, Charlemagne's conquest of Saxony was spelt out in the symbolic language of expansionist monotheistic universalism.
14 In 2006, Yitzhak Hen introduced a radically new explanatory model to this discussion by proposing that Charlemagne's decision to convert the Saxons by force had actually been inspired by the king's encounter with Islam. 15 According to Hen, Charlemagne became acquainted with the king with an Islamic system of subjecting other religious groups during his expedition to Spain in 777-778 he. Supported and counselled by Hispanic refugees to the Frankish realm such as Theodulf of Orléans, Charlemagne decided to convert the Saxons by force. This decision, Hen claims, was taken in 795, the year to which he redates the particularly harsh Capitulatio de partibus Saxoniae, 16 a document assigned to the period 775-90
by the editor Alfred Boretius, 17 to the year 782 by traditional scholarship. 18 In 795, Alcuin, the principal opponent to Charlemagne's policy of forced conversion, was removed from the centre of power, thus leaving the floor to Theodulf who -consciously or unconsciously, this remains open -ushered in a new policy of forced conversion by following ›Islamic‹ principles of dealing with subjected peoples of other religion. Alcuin was only able to formulate his opposition to this new policy in writing, as various letters from the year 796 suggest, which were written to various influential courtiers as well as to the king himself. 19 On this basis,
Hen concludes:
The exceptional, brutal policy of the Capitulatio did not emerge ex nihilo; it was deeply rooted in the political as well as the religious ideology that characterized al-Andalus at the time. The fact that within less than two years from its publication [i.e. 795 CE, according to Hen] , the Capitulatio was replaced by the more lenient Capitulare Saxonicum, suggests that the new politico-religious notions embedded in it were indeed strange and did not accord with the main stream of Carolingian political thought. It was an alien concept that did not fit the Carolingian reality, and hence it was discarded without any qualms shortly after its faults were exposed by Alcuin. (…) It was the language of jihad, brought to the Frankish court by Spanish Christians who sought refuge in the Frankish kingdom, if not by Theodulf of Orléans himself. 20 Thus, Hen introduced a new and far-reaching explanation to the discussion sketched out above. Thanks to what Hen terms a »migration of ideas«, Islam had left its imprint on the spread of Christianity beyond the borders of the former Roman Empire. According to this explanatory model, neither the mentality of a warrior elite, nor the latent aggressive universalism of Christianity, but Islam has to be held responsible for the fact that the diffusion of Christianity acquired a new, hitherto unknown, violent dimension.
The primary aim of the present article is to raise and -at least partially -answer questions that arise from Hen's hypotheses and the premises they are built on. Hen seems to believe that Charlemagne's informants were able to present the king with a clear-cut description of how Muslims dealt with adherents of other religions. It is not self-evident, however, that Islam of the late eighth century had already developed a systematic approach to non-Muslim religions that could be adopted by external observers. The first part of the article is thus dedicated to a sketch of the scholarly debate on this subject as well as the principle features of the Arabic-Islamic subjection of non-Muslim societies in the western Mediterranean.
Even if Islam had already developed clear principles of dealing with other religions in the period under investigation, it cannot be taken for granted that the Carolingian elite was aware of these principles. Hen correctly suggests that the Carolingians knew much more about Muslim al-Andalus than is usually acknowledged, but neglects to define this knowledge in concrete terms. The second part of the article is thus dedicated to understanding what Charlemagne and his entourage could have known about the Muslim treatment of non-Muslims. Hen's entire argument hinges on specific passages of the Capitulatio de partibus Saxoniae, which he defines as clearly influenced by ›Islamic‹ thought. Consequently, this part of the article also discusses if these passages clearly reflect Islamic influence or rather build on previous Christian ways of dealing with other religions and of organizing and administrating Christianity.
The emergence of an Islamic system of religious hierarchization
The idea that Islamic principles of dealing with adherents of other religions could inspire political decisions in neighbouring non-Muslim societies builds on the premise that, from the beginning of the Arabic-Islamic expansion onwards, the Muslims established a clear system of religious hierarchization in the societies they subjected. This system as well as the principles that governed it would have to be clearly and explicitly formulated, clearly implemented and thus clearly observable from the external point of view, not only of those non-Muslims affected by it, but also of non-Muslims otherwise uninvolved in the Islamic administration of multireligious communities who depended on second-hand information.
The Muslim subjection of the Middle East and the so-called Pact of ʿUmar
Hen's description of this Islamic system is based on one primary source, the so-called Pact of ʿUmar, as well as on secondary literature characterized by the quest of understanding the Islamic treatment of other religions from a systemic point of view.
21 Some of this literature resorts to a moral critique that focuses exclusively on the system's disadvantages for non-Muslims. 22 The literature's systemic approach does not deny, but tends to obscure that the Islamic legal system consists of a huge body of multiple and occasionally contradictory opinions that reacted to changing historical circumstances and thus evolved over the centuries. This applies, in particular, to the three centuries following the Arabic-Islamic expansion: in the seventh to ninth century, many legal opinions were formulated for the first time and only slowly became part of an increasingly systematized, but nonetheless pluralistic corpus of quasi-canonical juridical texts.
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Milka Levy-Rubin has demonstrated that Islamic legal opinions regarding the Muslim treatment of subjected non-Muslims have to be positioned within this process of legal evolution. As already emphasized by Albrecht Noth, the flexibility of early surrender agreements contributed to the middle-and long-term success of a process of expansion which allowed an Arab minority to take control over a region stretching from the Iberian Peninsula to Central Asia within approximately 120 years. 24 The rights of the subjected populations were generally established, not primarily along religious lines, but with regards to the question if the population in question had been subjected to Muslim rule as a result of force (ʿanwatan) or by negotiated peace agreement (ṣulḥan Depending on the circumstances that characterized the settlement of the new Muslim ruling elites in the conquered territories, different forms of cohabitation emerged. Muslim settlement took place in three major variants: (1) in places originally inhabited by non-Muslims and taken by force, Muslim dominance was fully established; (2) in places originally inhabited by non-Muslims but subjected peacefully, Muslim dominance was tempered by the necessity of respecting certain privileges of the subjected population agreed upon during the negotiations of surrender; (3) in newly founded military encampments (amṣār), initially only populated by Arabs, Muslims were dominant numerically. However, in the centuries following their establishment, even these military camps were increasingly populated by non-Muslims. Thus, cohabitation and intensifying interaction confronted Muslims from the Arabian Peninsula with the modes of life and religious customs of various subjected societies and began to affect the legal framework characteristic of the respective situation of conquest: since Muslims were a minority living among a majority of non-Muslims in all conquered territories, they had to prevent the religious assimilation of the Muslim population into the surrounding non-Muslim environment. This provoked various legal debates concerning the rights of non-Muslims under Muslim rule, the necessity of respecting the original clauses of peace agreements, and ultimately led to the formulation of laws of segregation in the course of the eighth century. These seem to have been increasingly canonized in the late eighth and ninth century.
29
The document known as the Pact of ʿUmar has to be placed into this context. The Pact of ʿUmar is often unreflectingly ascribed to the second caliph ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (ruled 13-23/634-44) and regarded as the prime normative text that defined the Muslim stance towards subjected non-Muslims for centuries to come. Careful study of the attested versions of the document has brought to light, however, that it can probably not be assigned to the early period of Muslim expansion, but has to be regarded as one among several products of the legal debates and the processes of legal systematization mentioned above, that increasingly gained importance in the course of the ninth century.
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The legal development sketched out above has mainly been reconstructed on the basis of source material produced in the Middle East, under Muslim control since about the middle of the seventh century. It would not be justified to generalize by automatically applying these findings to all territories under Muslim control. This holds particularly true for the Muslim West, which was brought under Muslim rule slightly later than the Middle East, North Africa being subjected in the course of the seventh century, the Iberian Peninsula invaded in 711. Until around the middle of the ninth century, the Muslim West was dependent on various cultural imports, including legal traditions, from the Middle Eastern heartlands of Islam. 31 Hen's assumption that the Carolingians received most of their knowledge about Islam from the Iberian Peninsula seems plausible: Carolingian relations with the Muslim Middle East amounted to one exchange of ambassadors with the Abbasid caliph al-Manṣur under Pippin the Short around 768, another one with Hārūn al-Rashīd under Charlemagne around 800 CE as well as some scarcely attested long-distance trade. 32 As will be shown shortly, Carolingian relations with al-Andalus were much more intense. Consequently, it is of utmost importance to understand the specificities of the situation of non-Muslims under Muslim rule in the Muslim West by providing an overview on the processes of subjection and religious hierarchization that affected the two population groups in contact with the Frankish sphere, i.e. North African Berbers and the Romanized population of the former Visigothic realm. The Berbers apostatized twelve times between Tripolis and Tanger, and their Islam did not become firm until Ṭāriq and Mūsā b. Nuṣayr crossed over to al-Andalus after the subjection of the Maghreb, and in the name of jihād a great number of footsoldiers and leaders of the Berbers also crossed. They settled there from the conquest onwards, and, during this time, Islam became an integral part of the Maghreb and the Berbers complied to its rule, and the word of Islam became firmly entrenched among them, and they lost sight of apostasy. Then khārijism took root among them, and they embraced it, having received it from mobile Arabs who had been exposed to it in Iraq. So the number of their (sectarian) groups multiplied, and their ways branched out.
47
In sum, Arabic-Islamic historiography suggests that most Berber groups subjected by the expanding Arabs were, in their majority, not treated as monotheists with the same rights as urban Romanized Christians, but rather as polytheists who were offered the two options of either battle or subjection and conversion. On this basis, scholarship has reconstructed a process of subjection that only enabled few Berber groups already adhering to a form of monotheism to retain a pre-Islamic religion. 48 Notwithstanding, the abovementioned variants of submission show that the Arabs' treatment of the Berbers did not amount to the mechanistic application of religious principles, but seems to have been dictated by the Arabs' need for human resources: seemingly non-monotheist Lawāta were given the possibility of paying the poll tax in slaves, whereas most other Berber groups were integrated into the Muslim host immediately upon subjection. In due course, these Berber groups formed an important part of the troops that invaded the Iberian Peninsula in 711. However, the »ambiguity in their status as tribute-paying subjects and militant members of the community of their conquerors«, as Michael Brett and Elisabeth Fentress put it, 49 is one important factor that has to be held responsible for the outbreak of the great Berber revolt in the 740s, as well as the Berber endorsement of heretic forms of Islam such as khārijism in the late eighth and ninth centuries, all of which were characterized by a loosening of the tie between Arab ethnicity and religiously legitimized rule. 50 In view of the emergence of these ethno-regional manifestations of Islam, it seems too simple to claim with Maya Shatzmiller that »Berber conversion remained a sore point in Berber/Arab relations and in the Berber communal and national memory for many years.« 51 Although the rapid process of formal conversion via military integration certainly did not lead to an immediate and profound Islamization of Berber groups, Berber resistance of the 740s and later was not directed against Islam as such, but against Arab domination.
47 Ibn Khaldūn, Tārīkh, ed. Zakkār and Shaḥāda, vol. 6, 144: »inna l-Barbar irtaddū ithnatay ʿashrata marra min Ṭarābulus ilā Ṭanja, wa-lam yastaqirr islāmuhum ḥattā ajāza Ṭāriq wa-Mūsā bin Nuṣayr ilā l-Andalus baʿda dawkh al-Maghrib wa-ajāza maʿahu kathīr min rijālāt al-Barbar umarā�uhum bi-rasm al-jihād. fa-istaqarrū hunālik min ladan al-fatḥ, fa-ḥayna�idhin istaqarra al-islām bi-l-Maghrib wa-adhʿana al-Barbar li-ḥukmihi, wa-rasakhat fīhim kalimat al-islām wa-tanāsū al-ridda. thumma nabaḍat fīhim ʿurūq al-khārijiyya fa-dānū bihā, wa-laqanūhā min al-ʿArab al-nāqila miman samaʿahā bi-l-ʿIrāq. wa-taʿaddadat ṭawā�ifuhum wa-tashaʿʿabat ṭuruquhā (…)«; trans. by the author. According to all extant versions as well as all references to the so-called Treaty of Tudmīr, possibly concluded 96/715 with the Visigothic noble Theodemir/Tudmīr, the Muslims guaranteed security and religious freedom to the Christian population of Orihuela, Baltana, Alicante, Mula, Villena, Lorca and Ello in exchange for the payment of specified taxes and the fulfillment of precautionary measures ensuring that the subjected population did not give shelter to potential enemies. In spite of all these references, the authenticity of the document is questioned by Molina, Tudmīr, [584] [585] . However, the arrangement described in the sources is generally regarded as plausible by scholars, cf. Chalmeta Gendrón, Invasión e islamización, 121, [206] [207] [208] [209] Manzano Moreno, Conquistadores, emires y califas, 43, 46, 53, 65, 67, 70, [106] [107] [108] [109] 112, 117, 121, 143, 263, [265] [266] [267] 278, 454. 74 This fiscal system cannot be regarded as stable, however: even after the surrender status of each community had been assessed, the amount of taxes could vary from governor to governor, some of whom seem to have exploited the Christian subject population, while others protected their possessions. In addition, demographic factors resulting from the arrival of new groups and high mortality rates necessitated adapting the tax registers and the methods of distribution in use. Latin-Christian and Arabic-Islamic sources both suggest that the measures taken were characterized by a certain degree of flexibility necessary to ensure the regular flow of fiscal revenues in a situation of political instability. Even if we believe that the late period of governors witnessed the emergence of a quasi-institutional arrangement between conquerors and conquered, the latter represented by the qūmis, the scant information at our disposal does not allow to verify how far the latter's influence extended into the subjected Christian society of the Iberian Peninsula, especially if we account for regional discrepancies brought about by different circumstances of conquest, varying settlement patterns and forms of regional and local rule.
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Since the extraction of fiscal resources from a recently subjected population is a common feature of probably every conquest, we must ask if the payment of taxes was explicitly understood as having a religious dimension by the affected population. The Chronicle of 754, as cited above, defines the fiscal territory in geographical terms as Spania or Iberia, the taxpayers as Christiani. It thus suggests that the payment of taxes was in some way linked to the religion of the tax payers, especially considering that this collective term never appears in those parts of the chronicle that describe the Iberian Peninsula before the Muslim invasion.
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The fact that the subjected inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula probably understood from an early period onwards that they paid taxes as Christians to non-Christian conquerors, 77 does not allow us to infer that the Andalusian governors legitimized the fiscal system in religious terms vis-à-vis the subjected population or imposed a rigid system of explicitly formulated Islamic norms on the conquered society. Later Arabic-Islamic sources on this period use the terminology of dhimma, dhimmat Muḥammad or even dhimmat Allāh, but do not all employ the term jizya, usually regarded as an essential feature of the Islamic system of religious (including fiscal) hierarchization. In general, these historiographical sources focus on the establishment of a link between the payment of taxes and resulting »protection« (dhimma), but do not dwell on the religious character or the religious justification of extracting fiscal resources.
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Whereas those involved and affected probably understood that the Muslim extraction of taxes from non-Muslim subjects was not only based on the dichotomy of conquerors and conquered, but also on their religious alterity, a legal system providing an explicit Islamic justification of this relationship does not seem to have existed under the rule of the Andalusian governors. Al-Khushanī (d. 371/981), author of a History of the Judges of Córdoba 75 Cf. Chalmeta Gendrón, Invasión e islamización, Manzano Moreno, Conquistadores, emires y califas, The Continuatio hispana, ed. Mommsen, acknowledges that Muḥammad was seen as a prophet ( § 12, 338: propheta eorum), refers to urbes Romanas ( § 15, 339) in connection with Sisebut's subjection of Iberian cities held by the Byzantines, and generally defines the pre-Muslim Iberian Peninsula in geographical (Iberia, Hispania, Yberie, Spania, Spanii, 26, 36, 65, pages 339, 341, 351) or ethno-political terms, either speaking of the »realm of the Goths« or linking the ethnonym »Gothi« to the accession of a new king (regnum Gothorum, regnum Wisegothorum, reges Gothorum, Gothi, 21, 23, 26, 35, 46, 49, 53, 58, 67, 71, 74, 343, [348] [349] [350] [352] [353] [354] In a moment that can be dated very approximatively to the emirate of ʿAbd alRaḥmān II, Córdoba witnessed unprecedented efforts to import the principles of Muslim practices and norms from the Orient. At this moment one still cannot speak of a network of Andalusī ʿulama � as is evident from the fact that only a handful of Andalusī teachers can be ascribed to the period between the end of the eighth and the first decades of the ninth centuries (second-third century of the hijra). However, a hundred years having passed after the conquest, an enormous interest to become acquainted with the theoretical, practical and juridical foundations of Islam arises in al-Andalus. Over the years, this initial interest becomes a veritable torrent of people who engrossed themselves in religious knowledge. Yaḥyā related to me from Mālik that he had heard that ʿUmar b.ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz wrote to his governors telling them to relieve any people who payed the jizya from paying the jizya if they became Muslims. Mālik said: »The sunna is that there is no jizya due from women or children of people of the Book, and that jizya is only taken from men who have reached puberty. The people of dhimma and the Magians do not have to pay any zakāt on their palms or their vines or their crops or their livestock. This is because zakāt is imposed on the Muslims to purify them and to be given back to their poor, whereas jizya is imposed on the people of the Book to humble them. As long as they are in the country they have agreed to live in, they do not have to pay anything on their property except the jizya. If, however, they trade in Muslim countries, coming and going in them, a tenth is taken from what they invest in such trade. This is because jizya is only imposed on them on conditions, which they have agreed on, namely that they will remain in their own countries, and that war will be waged for them on any enemy of theirs, and that if they then leave that land to go anywhere else to do business they will have to pay a tenth. Whoever among them does business with the people of Egypt, and then goes to Syria, and then does business with the people of Syria and then goes to Iraq and does business with them and then goes on to al-Madīna, or Yemen, or other similar places, has to pay a tenth. People of the Book and Magians do not have to pay any zakāt on any of their property, livestock, produce or crops. The sunna still continues like that. They remain in the religion they were in, and they continue to do what they used to do. If in any one year they frequently come and go in Muslim countries then they have to pay a tenth every time they do so, since that is outside what they have agreed upon, and not one of the conditions stipulated for them. This is what I have seen the people of knowledge of our city doing.
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In sum, al-Andalus of the eighth and ninth centuries went through a process of legal systematization that is comparable to the one described by Milka Levy-Rubin for the Middle East of the seventh and eighth centuries. In the last quarter of the eighth century,i.e. the time when Charlemagne was occupied with the conquest of Saxony, a clear-cut Islamic system of dealing with non-Muslims laid down in canonical texts did not exist on the Iberian Peninsula. From this point of view, Hen's assumption that the Carolingian court of the late eighth century could have been inspired by an explicitly formulated Islamic system of religious hierarchization, in particular the so-called Pact of ʿUmar, seems highly questionable.
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Carolingian knowledge about the Muslim treatment of non-Muslims
It is certain, however, that the Carolingians were aware of the Muslim conquest of the Iberian Peninsula and of the fact that the population of the former Visigothic realm was now subject to a new ruling elite. It is highly probable that, in the period between the Muslim invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 711 and the beginning of the Saxon campaigns in the 770s, the ruling elites (45), 293: »wa-ḥaddathanī ʿan Mālik annahu balaghahu anna ʿUmar bin ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, kataba ilā ʿummālihi an yaḍʿū al-jizya ʿamman aslama min ahl al-jizya ḥīna yuslimūn: qāla Mālik maḍat al-sunna an lā jizya ʿalā nisā� ahl al-kitāb wa-lā ʿalā ṣibyānihim wa-anna l-jizya lā tu�khadh illā min al-rijāl alladhīna qad balaghū al-ḥulum wa-laysa ʿalā ahl al-dhimma wa-lā ʿalā l-Majūs fī nakhīlihim wa-lā kurūmihim walā zurūʿihim wa-lā mawāshīhim ṣadaqa li-anna l-ṣadaqa innamā wuḍiʿat ʿalā l-muslimīn taṭhīran lahum wa-raddan ʿalā fuqarā�ihim wa-waḍaʿat al-jizya ʿahā ahl al-kitāb ṣaghāran lahum fa-hum mā kānu bi-baladihim alladhīna ṣālaḥū ʿalayhi laysa ʿalayhim shay� siwā l-jizya fī shay � min amwālihim illā anna yattajirū fī bilād al-muslimīn wa-yakhtalifū fīhā fa-yu�khadh minhum al-ʿushr fīmā yadīrūna min al-tijārāt wa-dhālik annahum innamā wuḍiʿat ʿalayhim al-jizya wa-ṣālaḥū ʿalayhā ʿalā an yuqarrū bi-bilādihim wa-yuqātil ʿanhum ʿadūwuhum fa-man kharaja minhum min bilādihi ilā ghayrihā yatjar ilayhā fa-ʿalayhi al-ʿushr (…) wa-hādhā alladhī adraktu ʿalayhi ahl al-ʿilm bi-baladinā«; translation adapted from http://ahadith.co.uk/permalink-hadith-669 (retrieved on 17 May 2016). 
Pathways of transmission
The earliest Muslim raids into Frankish territory took place in the 720s. 98 An ambivalent figure in this context is Eudo, the dux of Aquitaine, who is credited with having defended the Frankish realm from Saracen attacks in some sources, accused of collaboration with the latter in other sources.Two Hispano-Latin chronicles claim that Eudo's troops routed the Muslims at Toulouse, killing their governor al-Samḥ (ruled c. 100-02/719-21). 99 In the Liber pontificalis, Eudo even appears as the person responsible for defending the Frankish realm from the Saracen onslaught in 725-26. 100 Sources produced in the Carolingian orbit, in turn, accuse Eudo of having incited either the same or a later Muslim incursion into the Frankish realm. 101 Paul the Deacon points to tensions between Eudo and Charles Martel. In line with earlier sources claiming that Eudo was eventually forced to call Charles for help, he states that both joined forces against the Saracens around 732.
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Regardless of his exact loyalties, Eudo had the possibility of acquiring and transmitting information, not only about the Muslim conquerors of the Iberian Peninsula, but also about the Arab treatment of Berbers on the Iberian Peninsula and, possibly, in North Africa. According to the Hispano-Latin Chronicle of 754, he married one of his daughters to a Berber chief (unus ex Maurorum gente) called »Munnuz« to forestall Muslim attacks against the Frankish realm. Munnuz, in turn, seems to have collaborated with Eudo to achieve independence from Arab rule in a period preceding the great Berber revolt. Munnuz rebelled against the new Andalusian governor ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Ghāfiqī (ruled 112-14/730-32) in 731, but was captured and beheaded, whereas Eudo's daughter was received honourably by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and then sent to the caliph in Damascus. 103 It is unclear how this information relates to the report provided by the Gesta episcoporum Autissiodorensium which mention that Aimo, the ruler of Zaragoza, broke a marriage alliance involving Eudo's daughter Lampagia. 104 All sources referring to Eudo agree, however, that he was, in some way or another, enmeshed in the complex frontier situation in the border zone between al-Andalus and the Frankish realm. 105 Since Eudo is credited with having eventually collaborated with Charles
Martel in all sources, we may surmise that the knowledge he acquired about circumstances under Muslim rule would have been transmitted to the leading Carolingian of his day.
Eudo was not the only potential transmitter of information. Other members of local elites in Aquitaine also seem to have collaborated with the Muslims. Certain chronicles even claim that the region of Avignon fell to the Saracens in 737 »because of treason committed by the local ruling elites.« 106 Moreover, we should consider that Muslim forces soon took control of parts of southern Gaul, including the city of Narbonne and the region around Arles, thus establishing relations with the local population. 107 An early counter-campaign conducted by
Charles Martell seems to have been unsuccessful. 108 The Muslims of Narbonne were expelled by his son Pippin who, after his victory around 752, was hampered in his quest of protecting Narbonne by the rebellious dux of Aquitaine, Waifar, around 761-762. 109 Pippin, however, did not only engage in hostilities with Muslims, but also received Saracen envoys -one from the governor of Girona and Barcelona, 110 another from Abbasid Baghdad, thus initiating Latin- 139 Gillard and Sénac, À propos de quelques Hispani, 168, on the possible identity of these men.
140 Gillard and Sénac, À propos de quelques Hispani, 166, emphasize »que c'est le contexte politique et militaire qui détermina le rythme de la migration«, but assume -in spite of the lack of evidence -that these refugees were made up of people »refusant la domination musulmane«. In the same vein, Depreux, Préceptes pour les Hispani, 23, claims: »Ces Hispani avaient fui la domination de l'émirat d'al-Andalus pour se réfugier sous la tutelle, franque, c'est-à-dire sous une tutelle chrétienne.« 142 Again, the document was issued because the local authorities had failed to respect the rights of Hispanic refugees already spelt out in Charlemagne's Praeceptum of 812. As opposed to the latter document, Louis' Constitutio clearly spells out the refugees' motivation for seeking refuge in the Frankish realm.
Since we believe«, Louis wrote, »that it cannot have escaped your notice how, because of the unjust oppression and the cruel yoke which the people of the Saracens, most inimical to Christianity (inimicissima Christianitati), has imposed upon their necks, a number of men have fled to us from parts of Spain after leaving behind their own dwellings and possessions which belonged to them from hereditary right, and have settled in Septimania and in that part of Spain which has been left deserted by our margraves, and -eluding the power of the Saracens -have subjected themselves to our dominion by their free and obvious will, we want to make known to all of you that we have decreed that these men, received under our protection and defence, shall maintain their liberty.« In this context, Louis not only mentions Hispani, »who reside in these places at present«, but also Hispani who, »until this time will have sought refuge under our custody from the power of their enemies. If this people venerated God and pleased Christ, / and were bewetted with the unction of holy baptism, / then we would be obliged to conclude peace, and to hold this peace, / so that it could be joined, through God, with religion. / But it remains execrable and spurns our / Salvation, and follows the orders of the demon. Notwithstanding, documents attributed to Louis the Pious do not necessarily bespeak a sweeping condemnation of the Muslim faith on the part of the king. The Constitutio de Hispanis secunda, issued 10 February 816, also mentions Hispani, »who have eluded the power of the Saracens and have sought refuge under our or our father's custody«, 147 but refrains from the polemics characteristic of the document issued one year earlier. Even more interesting is a letter written by Louis around 830 to the entire people of Mérida (cuncto populo Emeritano). It is unclear, if this letter, referring to Jesus Christ in the Invocatio, was really addressed to all religious groups which, in the 820s, must have populated the city of Mérida. In the letter, the king refers to an unjust form of tribute exacted from the city's populace by the ruling amīr ʿAbd al-Raḥmān II (ruled 206-38/822-52) and introduced by his father al-Ḥa-kam I (ruled 180-206/796-822):
We have heard of your tribulation and the multifaceted fears which you have endured because of the cruelty of King Abdiraman who, because of his insatiable greed for your possessions, which he has tried to take away from you, has often oppressed you violently. As we have learned, his father Abolaz had already done the same thing, who forced you to pay an unjustly imposed tax (censum) to him, of which you were not the debtors, thus transforming you from friends into foes and from obedient subjects of his to disobeying rebels because he wanted to deprive you of your liberty as well as burden and humiliate you with unjust taxes and tributes.
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Louis the Pious, involved in the affairs of Aquitaine and northeastern Spain from an early age onwards, was probably better informed about affairs of the Iberian Peninsula than his late father. The documents cited above suggest, moreover, that he may have been ideologically more averse to the Saracens whom he seems to have regarded as enemies of the Christian faith. The tribute exacted by these Saracens and explicitly mentioned by Louis is not defined, however, in religious terms, but simply as a form of oppression. According to his letter to the populace of Mérida, Louis associated this oppression, not with Islam, but with a specific period and individual rulers who destroyed pre-existing friendly relations existing up to the early reign of al-Ḥakam I by exacting unjust and humiliating forms of tribute. Thus, as late as 830, there is still no indication that the ruler of the Frankish realm had a clear conception of Islam, nor of a specifically Islamic system of dealing with non-Muslims.
The definition of the Saracens as enemies of Christianity, first formulated by Louis the Pious in 815, was taken up again by Charles the Bald in his Praeceptum pro Hispanis of 844, explicitly modeled on the earlier documents of Charlemagne and Louis the Pious. 149 The
Christian dimension of receiving Spanish refugees is much stronger, however, as already noted by Philippe Depreux: Charles the Bald emphasizes the religious dimension of giving assistance to fellow Christians, 150 demands that the Hispani should be received as belonging to the »unity of the faith«, 151 and decrees that the Hispani should be protected »by all faithful of the holy church of God«.
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In sum, it is possible to validate Hen's hypothesis that the Carolingians were much better informed about the situation of Christians in al-Andalus than can usually be gleaned from general accounts of the Carolingian era that do not focus, as does Philippe Sénac, on relations with Muslim Spain, or from general studies of Latin-Christian images of Islam that rarely provide a detailed description of Carolingian perceptions of Islam. 153 It may be added that the few existing studies on the Carolingian perception of Islam highlight that the latter cannot be reduced to negative stereotypes. 154 Corroborating these studies, analysis of the aforementioned sources procured the following results: Carolingian elites before, in and after the time of Charlemagne were very aware of the Muslim presence on and beyond the Iberian Peninsula, generally deemed hostile, but dealt with pragmatically if necessary. Carolingians, at the latest from Charlemagne onwards, were aware of the fact that the so-called Saracens were not Christians, but either heretics or infidels. 155 However, an explicit definition of the latter as anti-Christian non-Christians only appears in the reign of Louis the Pious, that is, long after the Carolingian takeover of Saxony. 156 Although Carolingian sources frequently mention tribute exacted from non-Muslims by Muslim authorities and, in sources post-815, even link the oppressive exercise of Saracen power and authority, including the exaction of tribute, to the Saracens' anti-Christian attitude, the extant texts do not betray a Carolingian awareness of a religiously justified Islamic system of religious hierarchization and taxation. It is very difficult to form a judgement on the question of whether Charlemagne and his entourage regarded the Saracens as a deviant religious group subjecting and oppressing Christians and Jews by exacting tribute from them for religious reasons, or whether they merely regarded the Saracens as just another variant of non-Christianized foreign conquerors who, not being part of the political-ecclesiastical system of the Frankish realm, were not entitled to subject (Latin) Christians. Both the Chronicle of Moissac and Louis the Piousʹ letter to the people of Mérida suggest a Carolingian awareness of fluctuations in the Saracen treatment of subjected Christians and Jews. The fact that succeeding Umayyad rulers are evaluated differently implies that the Carolingian observers did not regard Muslim al-Andalus as a society functioning according to a uniform legal system, but rather as a society in which the situation of the subjected Christian population largely depended on the indi-vidual non-Christian ruler. This accords with the fact that, in the Frankish realm, the earliest Latin sources describing concrete features of Muslim religion and society date from the tenth century.
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In spite of numerous military confrontations, the taking of captives and hostages, diplomatic exchange and other forms of communication and information transfer, early Carolingian images of Muslim society still seem to have been rather vague. Carolingian sources do not suggest that Charlemagne and his entourage clearly understood the functioning of the Islamic society of al-Andalus. This raises the question how they could have adopted a religiously defined hierarchized fiscal system from a society they only dimly understood. Since it is equally impossible to claim that the Carolingian elite around Charlemagne idealized or admired the so-called Saracens, we must ask ourselves why the Carolingians should have wanted to adopt the latter's religiously defined hierarchized fiscal system. If one really insisted on a migration of ideas from al-Andalus to the Carolingian court under the circumstances sketched out above, then this transcultural inspiration would would have had to have taken place unconsciously.
The Capitulatio de partibus Saxoniae: Islamic or Christian influences?
Hen's entire argument that this migration of ideas took place, hinges on specific passages of the Capitulatio de partibus Saxoniae which he defines as ›Islamic‹. According to Hen, the decree has no precedent in the history of the Christian mission, and it seems to be more than a faint echo of the Islamic concept of jihad. I would like to suggest that it was indeed the notion of jihad, with which, no doubt, Theodulf was familiar, that stood behind the formulation of the Capitulatio's forced conversion policy.
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Closer analysis reveals, however, that the Capitulatio de partibus Saxoniae does not reflect a clear-cut Islamic system of dealing with infidels. Even if we assumed an Islamic influence, then the Capitulatio would contain a very particular mixture of ›Islamic‹ principles of treating non-Muslims.
The Capitulatio includes the threat of capital punishment for those refusing to be baptized, a ruling Hen leads back to the ›Islamic principle‹ of offering the choice between death or conversion to non-monotheists. 159 Its primary source is Qur�ān 9:5, that orders its readers to aggress and kill those who associate something with God (al-mushrikūn), generally defined as polytheists, unless they repent, pray and pay the Muslim alms tax (zakāt). This call to forced conversion is attenuated to a certain degree, in that it (1) forms part of the only Qurʿānic sūra not introduced by the basmallah, i. e. the invocation »in the name of God, the most gracious, the merciful«; (2) is clearly linked to the historical context of the early Muslimsʹ conflict with the Meccans (9:1); (3) is surrounded by verses which require believers to respect treaty obligations with polytheists who have kept their pledges (9:4); and grants asylum and a safe-conduct to polytheists who seek refuge with the Muslims without forcing them to convert (9:6). In consequence, the inner-Muslim theological and juridical debate about these verses cannot be reduced to one single opinion on the correct Muslim conduct vis-à-vis non-monotheist non-Muslims. 160 In the case of the Berbers, these Islamic principles seem to have been implemented by either demanding tribute from monotheist and nonmonotheist Berbers or by forcing them to become part of the Muslim army. The ruling of the Capitulatio is much more precise and leaves no interpretative options.
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The Capitulatio also obliges the Saxons to pay the tithe, a religious tax Hen wrongly equates with the jizya, i.e. the Muslim poll tax requisitioned from adherents to non-Muslim monotheistic ›people of the book‹, instead of regarding it as the equivalent to the zakāt, i.e. the (alms) tax required to be paid by (newly converted) Muslims. 162 In the Frankish realm of the eighth century, the tithe was not yet universally established. However, it had already been declared obligatory by several ecclesiastical authorities in and outside the Frankish realm in pre-Islamic times. 163 To impose this tax, there was no need to draw on external inspiration, the more so as Alcuin's argument against the imposition of the tithe on the Saxons does not question its existence as such, but only its imposition on the newly converted. 164 Hen believes that the Frankish legislator's satisfaction with seeing that the churches of Saxony receive greater honour than the temples of idols can be traced back to Islamic principles of prohibiting the construction and repair of synagogues and churches as well as of ensuring the greater height, higher visibility and prestige of Muslim edifices in hierarchized pluri-religious societies under Muslim rule. 165 Apart from the Christianized Saxons who collaborated with the Franks, the religious landscape in Saxony at the end of the eighth century was dominantly non-monotheist. Had the Carolingian elite around Charlemagne looked for a system of how to deal with pagans, why did they deem it necessary to adapt Islamic rules for dealing with non-Muslim monotheist places of worship to pagan Saxon If we believed that Theodulf and Charlemagne were inspired by a Muslim system of legal thought, especially with regards to the position of non-Muslim religious groups within Muslim dominated societies, we would have to concede that they took an enormous amount of creative liberty when adapting this allegedly Islamic system to circumstances in Saxony. They would have reinterpreted, strongly modified and creatively mixed principles of dealing with pagans (forced conversion), non-Muslim monotheists (poll tax, building and repairing of churches and synagogues, church asylum) as well as with Muslims and non-Muslims alike (ḥadd-punishments). What Hen classifies as a the product of a »migration of ideas« would thus amount to a garbled mixture of legal principles, which again could not be assigned to a clear-cut Islamic system of dealing with other religions.
All in all, we may ask ourselves, why the Franks, assiduous compilers of Roman and vernacular legal traditions, should have needed the inspiration of Islamic norms and laws. Many of the rulings formulated in the Capitulatio de partibus Saxoniae could be explained as essential features of legislative action by right of conquest: many of the rulings of the Capitulatio serve to assure the conquerors' control of the newly acquired territory, while serving the enforcement of Christianity. According to Janet Nelson, Charlemagne needed no external inspiration to legitimise war, whether against Saxons, Slavs, Avars or anyone else. The Christian Church had already provided such legitimisation long since, couching it, naturally, in terms of defence of the Church. It hadn't taken the young Charlemagne long to appreciate the political and economic benefits of religiously-sanctioned plundering.
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The argument that Charlemagne moved in a Christianized sphere that provided ample justification for the forced conversion of Saxony is seconded by various scholars who point, not only to Roman legal traditions, 171 but also to contemporary eschatological interpretations of Christianity, 172 as well as to the contemporary belief that Charlemagne's use of violence was justified from a Christian point of view. As Rachel Stone has recently stressed, eighth-century texts »repeatedly justify or take for granted aggressive warfare against both Christian and non-Christian opponents«. Considering the Latin-Christian tradition of justifying the use of force to eradicate non-Christian cults and to impose a Christian system of beliefs, cult and administration, 174 the idea that Charlemagne may have been inspired by an Islamic system of religious hierarchization and jihād, seems very far-fetched. A few well-known examples will suffice: Emperor Theodosius I (d. 395) is credited repeatedly with having instigated the destruction of ›pagan‹ cult sites. 175 In 408, Augustine argued in a letter to Vincentinus that it did not matter if someone was forced to do something, but if he was being forced to do something good or bad. 176 In the same year, the Emperor Honorius ordered the destruction of all pagan altars as well as the confiscation of all temples under his dominion. 177 Various Merovingian saints are credited with violence against pagan cult sites, 178 while individual Merovingian, Visigothic and Lombard kings are credited with the forced conversion of Jews. 179 As argued at the beginning of this article, these instances of linking coercion and conversion were intra-societal phenomena. We should not forget, however, that the idea of taking up arms against a neighbour not considered as adhering to the ›true‹ faith, in this case ›heretic‹ Visigoths, was already ascribed to one of Charlemagne's predecessors, i.e. the Merovingian King Clovis, by Gregory of Tours.
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Conclusions
The previous deliberations have shown that it is rather difficult to invalidate the most prevalent explanatory models that try to make sense of Charlemagne's forced conversion of the Saxons. There certainly exist enough arguments to prove that the Carolingian combination of conquest and forced conversion was the result of a particular historical constellation in which several factors contributed to the military escalation of relations between Franks and Saxons. Given the prominent role of (missionary) Christianity in Carolingian administration and its political legitimization of Carolingian rule, it can probably be regarded as inevitable that Christianity and the church would have become involved -in one way or the other -in the expansion of the Frankish realm. Given the previous history of Christian violence against non-Christian or deviant Christian groups as well as the history of justifying corresponding activities, the decision to spread Christianity by force can thus be regarded as a ›potential option‹ in the progressing history of Christianization that would have been chosen sooner or later by the one or the other Christian warlords seeking to justify conquest and to make use of ecclesiastical administration to establish control over newly acquired territory, doing all this while maybe even acting in ›good faith‹. After all, Christianity was the symbolic language of the day, a symbolic language that permeated, or at least tried to permeate, all sectors of society, including the military. Against this backdrop, the question of responsibility seems rather secondary: early medieval warrior elites would have engaged in conquest in any case, regardless of the presence of a new monotheistic belief system. Forces of conquest do not need monotheism to become active. This observation relativizes the hypotheses of Assmann and Buc to a certain degree: monotheistic religions cannot be held responsible for an increase of violence in the history of humankind. They certainly provided new and original forms of justifying violence, oppression and subjection. All in all, however, they just became part of the all too human game of exercising power over others in innumerable variants: before the forceful emergence of monotheistic ideas in early Antiquity, e. g. in the pre-Israelite Middle East, and outside their sphere of influence, e.g. the Roman-Celtic sphere or China, humans have also conquered, subjected and exerted violence in many ways.
Such a relativist stance seems unsatisfying, however. Charlemagne's forced conversion of the Saxons is certainly interesting from the perspective of a historian trying to understand the manifestations and to trace the development of a specific variant of monotheistic ideas. Regarded from an evolutionary point of view, it is interesting to see how a complex set of ideas (the teachings of Jesus and their Pauline interpretation) became an integral and directing part of several social bodies (early Christian groups), expanding and infiltrating a larger sociopolitical and economic system (the Roman Empire) and eventually moving beyond this embryonic body social by taking on the variant forms of missionary and even conquering Christianity. In this context, it is noteworthy that both the Carolingian conquest of Saxony and the Muslim invasion of the Iberian Peninsula led to the emergence of flourishing societies which, on the whole, professed the faith imposed on them while becoming loci of extremely high cultural activity and productivity. Rather than justifying or even encouraging the combination of violence and religious coercion, this observation should lead us to accept that radical, violent changes in a political and religious system are not only destructive, but create new means of cultural expression, among other things by connecting hitherto peripheral regions to new centres of cultural productivity.
To those empathizing with the Christian ideal of improving mankind, Charlemagne's forced conversion of the Saxons may seem shocking and in need of explanation: it seems to fall out of line with a process of Christianization which, until this point, seems to have been fairly ›peace-ful‹. Such a view of the late antique process of Christianization tends to ignore, however, that, far from continuing in the footsteps of the powerless Judaeo-Christian minority of the first two centuries CE, late antique Christianity became an increasingly powerful tool of Roman and post-Roman politics that exerted a high degree of structural violence. This is not the place to discuss if either the Muslim subjection of the greater parts of the Mediterranean and the Middle East in the seventh and eighth centuries, or the structural violence exerted by the Muslim elites ruling after this process of subjection, were ›more violent‹ than the late antique and early medieval process of Christianization. It seems worthwhile to note, however, that in the longue durée of approximately 1300 years of Christian and Muslim conquest and religious integration, the expanding Christian power of the Norman-Staufen-Angevin Mezzogiorno, the Reconquista and the Spanish conquest of Central and Southern America tended to speak the language of religious conformity, whereas Islamic regimes expanding to subsaharan Africa, India and Malaysia, tended to insist, if in power, on a more or less rigid sociopolitical and religious hierarchy that ensured Muslim sovereignty. In both cases, physical and structural violence played an important role in establishing and maintaining the respective system. The degree to which both systems inspired each other is the topic of a huge debate that covers various fields of expertise. These range from the relationship between late antique Christian and early Islamic theology, 181 Andalusian and troubadour poetry, 182 the Islamic concept of jihād and the Christian concept of crusades, 183 the Islamic ribāṭ and the Christian military orders 184 to that between the Islamic madrasa and the European-Christian university. 185 In all these cases, prominent scholars have either endorsed or questioned the idea that a ›migration of ideas‹ or, to use another technical term, a ›cultural transfer‹ had taken place. In most cases, however, it seems difficult to arrive at a final conclusion: in each case, the parallels as well as the differences are striking enough to maintain the conscientious scholar in a precarious and constantly oscillating balance of simultaneously endorsing and refuting the prevalent views in question -a problem apparent to everyone engaging with Jörg Feuchter's, Friedhelm Hoffmann's and Bee Yun's edited volume Cultural Transfers in Dispute.
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At the end of his argument that Charlemagne's forced conversion of the Saxons was inspired by the Islamic concept of jihād and religious hierarchization, Yitzhak Hen rightly asks scholars to question their »bold tendency to dismiss instantly any Muslim influence on the cultural, religious, and political history of early medieval Francia«, 187 an assertion with which most accomplished scholars in the field of Andalusian-Carolingian relations, including Abdurrahman Ali El-Hajji, Philippe Sénac and others, would probably agree. If Charlemagne's forced conversion of the Saxons was inspired by Andalusian Islam, however, is another question. This article has tried to show that, while such an influence cannot be ruled out completely, given the close connections between al-Andalus and the Frankish realm, it does seem highly implausible. In the period under scrutiny, Andalusian Islam was only beginning to establish a more or less clearly structured system of religious hierarchization. The evidence of the Carolingian sources does not allow us to trace the migration of a legal concept of religious hierarchization. Last but not least, the Capitulatio de partibus Saxoniae cannot be regarded as a manifestation of ›Islamic‹ thought. Rather, Hen's analysis of the document resorts to hypotheses that seem, all in all, far-fetched, sometimes illogical, and, in many cases, built on false premises, including very ahistorical and imprecise notions of the concepts of jihād, jizya and dhimma. Every feature of the document can be explained in alternative ways that do not need to resort to an external Islamic inspiration, especially if the preceding history of Christianization is considered. If we still insist on the possibility of a migration of ideas against this backdrop, then we would have to consider that the Muslim conquerors of al-Andalus and the Christian conquerors of Saxony were inspired by the same Zeitgeist, the latter strongly marked the symbolic language of expanding universal truth. Such an interpretation, however, would not be very far from Assmann's and Buc's assessment of the expansionist character of universalist monotheism, a form of belief firmly entrenched in the Euromediterranean of the seventh and eighth centuries and manifesting itself in different variations which were built on the same Judaeo-Hellenistic foundations, but not necessarily directly related to each other. 188 It is at this point that conscientious historical research has to admit that, from a methodological point of view, thinking in plausible alternatives seems more sound than insisting on one, and only one interpretation of a historical constellation. We have to admit, after all, that we cannot see but the tip of the iceberg.
